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The Monstrosity of Parental Involvement:
Formation through Reading in Shelley and Rousseau
Amy Shuffelton
Loyola University Chicago
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is, at face value, a critique of parental neglect.
After Victor Frankenstein succeeds in “discovering the cause of generation
and life; nay, more … [becomes] capable of bestowing animation upon lifeless
matter,” he abandons his creation.1 In language evoking both sexual experience
and childbirth, he initially describes how “the astonishment which I had at first
experienced on this discovery soon gave place to delight and rapture. After so
much time spent in painful labor, to arrive at once at the summit of my desires,
was the most gratifying consummation of my toils.”2 Piecing together a “human
frame” out of parts gleaned in “charnel houses,” “the dissecting room and the
slaughter-house,” he creates a living being.3 The moment it breathes and moves,
however, Victor views its creation as a “catastrophe.” “[B]reathless horror and
disgust filled my heart,” he recounts.4 Victor abandons the monster and in doing
so sets off a chain of events leading to the death of himself and everyone he
cares about. As Shelley’s novel traces the monster’s sentimental (mis)education
through both Victor’s telling and the monster’s own narrative, readers see the
monster shift from sympathetic identification with humanity to outraged desire
for vengeance against the parent who neglected to attend with sufficient care
to his formation, physical and moral.
Frankenstein was not Shelley’s only critique of parental neglect. In her
biographical essay on Jean-Jacques Rousseau in Lives of the Most Eminent French
Writers, she condemned Rousseau’s abandonment of his and Therese le Vasseur’s
children to a foundling hospital. Shelley judges this action “criminal”: “Five of
his children were thus sent to a receptacle where few survive; and those who
do go through life are brutified by their situation or depressed by the burden,
ever weighing at the heart, that they have not inherited the commonest right of
humanity, a parent’s care.”5 Shelley notes the distance Rousseau kept between
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himself and Therese (comparable to Victor’s from his fiancée Elizabeth during
his act of creation), and his persistence in believing he did right. Like Victor, who
brings the monster to life with no plan for taking care of it and then maintains,
even in the face of evidence to the contrary, that the monster could never have
been well-raised anyway, Rousseau “first acted, he says, without serious examination of the morality of his conduct; but when he commenced author, he
gave attentive consideration to the point and satisfied himself that he did right.”6
Herself conceived by unmarried writers, Shelley had grounds for taking
affront. Her parents, William Godwin and Mary Wollestonecraft, had dropped
their infamous opposition to marriage once Wollestonecraft became pregnant,
wedding for the baby’s sake. The infant Mary Godwin was still unable to inherit
her mother’s care, as Wollestonecraft died of childbed fever ten days after giving
birth. Raised by Godwin, she felt abandoned by him in childhood when he took
a second wife (with whom Mary never got along) and then again when he refused
to see her after she and Percy Bysshe Shelley took him at his (earlier) word on
free love and eloped. Inheritor of her parents’ insight that marital conventions
entailed women’s oppression for the sake of a small measure of protection,
she was a staunch defender throughout her life of women left alone to care for
dependents.7 Her perspective as Percy Shelley’s wife gave her additional grounds
to condemn Rousseau’s fecklessness. “Like Frankenstein,” as literary scholar
Barbara Johnson wryly notes, “Percy was known for his unreliable chemistry
experiments, and for his disregard for the life around him.”8
Yet for all the correlations with her own tragic story of dead mother
and dead babies (three of the Shelleys’ four children died in early childhood,
the first—whom Mary had not wanted—a year before Mary started writing this
novel), Frankenstein is not autobiographical in any simple sense. And, as with the
monster, it would be a grave mistake to take it at face value. Frankenstein is as much
a critique of parental involvement—or, more precisely, of philosophical texts that
engendered ideological prescriptions for 19th century mothers and that serve as
important progenitors of contemporary parental involvement discourse—as of
parental neglect.9 Of those philosophical texts, the most influential, and Shelley’s
main target, is Rousseau’s Emile. At the heart of the novel, the monster tells
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the story of his education by a family, the De Lacys, that replicates Rousseau’s
description of the household Emile and Sophie will set up to educate the next
generation. The monster watches and listens from a shelter as Felix (“happy”)
De Lacy and his sister Agatha (“good”) tend their cottage and care for their blind
father, welcome Felix’s beloved—an “Arabian” girl named Safie—and teach Safie
to speak and read their language. His learning initially progresses more or less
as Rousseau theorizes in Emile.10 When the monster decides to reveal himself
to the De Lacys in the hope of winning their friendship, however, they turn on
him violently because of his appearance. For the disheartened monster, this
is the point where feelings of “rage and revenge” wipe out his sympathy with
humanity.11 Shelley’s novel thus challenges Emile’s promise to create, through
parental education done right, future generations of men who are happy and
good, or so this article argues. Shelley’s challenge to Emile’s premises extends
beyond the pages about the De Lacys. Tracing connections between two pieces
of Shelley’s writing, Frankenstein and her biographical essay on Rousseau, and
three of Rousseau’s, the Confessions, La Nouvelle Heloise, and Emile, with a nod
to Mary Wollestonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Women, this article reads
Frankenstein as a young mother’s rebuttal of discourse on motherhood that she
correctly read as patriarchal, punitive, and silencing. In our current era of policy-makers and pundits enamored with telling mothers (and, increasingly, fathers)
why their children’s miseducations are their parents’ fault, Shelley’s recognition
that model parents are a monstrous fantasy is refreshingly respectful of the
complexity of parent/child relations.

I BECAME THE MAN WHOSE LIFE I READ
Written as a frame narrative, Frankenstein contains three nested first-person narratives. The monster’s story is framed by Victor’s, whose story is framed
by the explorer Walton’s letters to his sister Margaret Walton Saville, telling her
of his encounter with Victor and the monster en route to the North Pole. The
introduction, by another MWS, frames the whole. Actually, two introductions
frame it, as the original 1818 introduction, written by Percy in Mary Wollestonecraft Shelley’s name, was supplemented in the 1831 edition with a new introPHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 2018
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duction, by Mary, that told the famous story of her conception of the novel
in response to a ghost-story writing challenge posed by Percy and Lord Byron
in the rainy summer of 1816. Both introductions contain a disavowal of her
literary offspring. In the 1818 introduction, Percy has her offer this disclaimer:
“The opinions which naturally spring from the character and situation of the
hero are by no means to be conceived as existing always in my own conviction;
nor is any inference justly to be drawn from the following pages as prejudicing any philosophical doctrine of whatever kind.”12 The novel was originally
published anonymously, and reviewers, who assumed that it was written by a
man, criticized the novel’s perceived failure to moralize about the blasphemy
of Victor’s actions. The revelation of its author as female only intensified that
critique.13 In the 1831 introduction, Mary explains that she is willing to share
the story of how the tale was conceived because “I shall thus give a general
answer to the question so very frequently asked me—how I, then a young girl,
came to think of and to dilate upon so very hideous an idea.”14 As her language
suggests, books are akin to children, their creation a kind of childbirth, and
both are understood to be reflections of their parents.
Johnson’s “My Monster/My Self ” interprets the monster as a “figure”
for the monstrosity of autobiography. While all publication is a kind of self-assertion, there is something especially narcissistic about autobiography, which
attempts to reflect the self back to itself and replicate this self-image. As Judith
Butler comments, to call the monster a figure “names the predicament” inherent
in forming a self through writing one’s life story:
disrupting that narcissistic project and exposing that impossibility; it signifies precisely that dimension of the self
one cannot bear to see at the same time that it absorbs and
enacts the insuperable conflict of the autobiographical
project itself. … The monster does not merely reflect back
the author [Shelley] or the character [Victor] but refuses to
do so, running off in various directions, unmasterable and
destructive.15
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For women, Johnson writes, autobiographical writing has been doubly problematic:
since the very notion of a self, the very shape of human
life stories, has always, from Saint Augustine to Freud, been
modeled on the man. Rousseau’s—or any man’s—autobiography consists in the story of the difficulty of conforming
to the standard of what a man should be. The problem for
the female autobiographer is, on the one hand, to resist the
pressure of masculine autobiography as the only literary genre
available for her enterprise, and, on the other, to describe a
difficulty in conforming to a feminine ideal which is largely
a fantasy for the masculine, not the feminine, imagination.16
Johnson’s scholarship opened doors to interpreting Frankenstein as commentary
on the perils to women of forming a self through writing. Here, I explore Frankenstein as, also, commentary on the potential deformation of women’s selves
through reading. Insofar as male characters offer all the first-person accounts
of reading in Frankenstein, it is not immediately obvious why reading should be
treated as particularly dangerous to women. At the end of the telescoped narratives of miseducative reading, however, the monster’s story alludes to Rousseau’s
most gender-fantastical texts, which portray a monstrous masculine fantasy of
a feminine ideal to a feminized readership.
The question of what a man should be is at the forefront of Shelley’s
biographical essay on Rousseau. Written in an era when historical accounts of
great men were considered an important mode of moral education, “Rousseau” begins with a character assessment. Shelley credits him with what she
says, “in ordinary men … would be named egotism or vanity” but in “men
of imagination, and eloquence, and mental energy” amounts to a “lively and
intimate apprehension of their own individuality, sensations and beings, which
appears to be one of the elements of that order of minds which feel impelled
to express their thoughts and disseminate their views and opinions through the
medium of writing.”17 This is a paradox worthy of Rousseau: what in ordinary
men would be egotism is not egotism in men so egotistical they feel justified
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 2018
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in disseminating that ego. Given Shelley’s sophistication as a reader and writer,
this paradox should be treated like Rousseau’s paradoxes, as a red flag, a warning
to attend closely to forthcoming literary sleight-of-hand.
After a scant paragraph about Rousseau’s birth in Geneva, his mother’s
death following childbirth, and his early upbringing by his father, Shelley’s essay
turns to another early influence: his reading material. The prominence she gives
his account of this, juxtaposed with the preceding paradox, advises readers that
to know what to make of Rousseau’s writing, we need to know what to make
of his reading. In an essay that generally narrates more than it quotes, Shelley
includes an extended quotation from Rousseau’s Confessions about Plutarch’s Lives,
which he read in childhood. Rousseau himself credits Plutarch with forming
his character. It “cured me somewhat of my love for romances,” he says, and
“formed that independent and republican spirit, that proud untamable character, impatient of yoke and servitude.”18 In turning from romances, i.e. novels,
associated then as now with femininity, to Plutarch’s Lives, Rousseau became
a man as well as a citizen. “I became,” he says, “the man whose life I read.”19
Whether encountered in the original Confessions or in a book whose
title—Lives of the Most Eminent French Writers—echoes Plutarch’s, this statement
is another red flag. Suppose that, as Rousseau claims, the reader of an account
of an eminent man’s life indeed becomes the man whose life he reads. Or, as
the reader of a book titled Lives, becomes successive men, as one man’s life story
yields to the next. As readers of the life of Rousseau, what sort of man are we
apt to become? Should we really run the risk of reading the life of this man,
who generates lives only to abandon them?
Frankenstein includes several cautionary tales about the effects of reading
on a child’s formation. The most fraught is Victor’s. “Natural philosophy is the
genius that has regulated my fate,” Victor tells the explorer Walton. “I desire
therefore, in this narration, to state those facts which led to my predilection for
that science.” 20When he was thirteen, on a family vacation to the spa-town of
Thonon, inclement weather kept him inside and he “chanced to find a volume
of the works of Cornelius Agrippa,” a Renaissance philosopher fascinated by
the occult.21 Upon reading Agrippa’s works, says Victor, “A new light seemed to
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dawn upon my mind; and, bounding with joy, I communicated my discoveries
to my father.”22
In Victor’s account, his father’s reaction was a turning point in his education. “I cannot help remarking here,” Victor says, “the many opportunities
instructors possess of directing the attention of their pupils to useful knowledge,
which they utterly neglect. My father looked carelessly at the title-page of my
book, and said ‘Ah! Cornelius Agrippa! My dear Victor, do not waste your time
upon this; it is sad trash.”23 In lieu of this brief warning, Victor says, his father
might have “taken the pains to explain to me that the principles of Agrippa had
been entirely exploded, and that a modern system of science had been introduced,
which possessed much greater powers than the ancient, because the powers of
the latter were chimerical, while those of the former were real and practical.”24
Had his father redirected his interests, “it is even possible that the train of my
ideas would never have received the fatal impulse that led to my ruin.”25
Contrasting lessons can be drawn from this story about how childhood
reading forms the man. In the straightforward interpretation, reading unchecked
by parental influence can deform a child, insofar as it draws him into flights of
imagination whose outcomes are as uncontrollable as the monster. Walton’s tale
of his childhood reading, which turned his imagination to nautical explorations,
can also be explained this way. “This expedition has been the favorite dream
of my early years,” he says. “I have read with ardor the accounts of the various
voyages which have been made in the prospect of arriving at the North Pacific
Ocean through the seas which surround the pole.”26 As in Victor’s story, parental
inattention is held responsible for miseducation. “My education was neglected,”
says Walton, “yet I was passionately fond of reading. These volumes were my
study day and night.”27
Yet there is something unbalanced about Victor’s criticism of his father,
Alphonse, as literary scholar William Veeder points out. “Victor is correct,”
Veeder says, “Alphonse should explain, not simply dismiss. But just as unquestionably, the magnitude of Alphonse’s failure is relevant too. … What parent has
not missed by at least this much the proper tone in a random moment?”28 Or,
perhaps Veeder concedes too much to Victor, as surely Alphonse has no obliPHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 2018
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gation to use his son’s every choice of reading material as an opportunity for a
lecture. Who would really want to be, or live with, a parent who did that? The
real problem is not the reading material but the grown-up child’s misguided belief
that his parent had an obligation to frame that material for him. The missed
lesson exemplifies not parental neglect but the unreasonableness of holding
parents responsible for every dimension of a child’s experience. The absurdity
of Victor’s expectation of his father, in the context of his self-absolution from
responsibility for his actions, suggests that expectations of parental involvement,
taken too far, deform the child’s ability to develop his own judgment and sense
of responsibility.
Like the other two narrators, the monster also has a story of how he
became the man whose life he read. The monster encounters three sets of
texts, each of which contributes to his education. He learns to read by overhearing Felix read aloud to Safie from Volney’s Ruins of Empires. In contrast
to Alphonse, Felix is a diligent interpreter. “I should not have understood the
purport of this book,” says the monster, “had not Felix, in reading it, given
very minute explanations.”29 The effect, however, is no more beneficial to the
monster than Alphonse’s non-explanation to Victor, as the text inspires “strange
feelings” in the monster.30 “Was man, indeed, at once so powerful, so virtuous,
and magnificent,” he begins to wonder, “yet so vicious and base?”31 As reading
Agrippa was for Victor, listening to Felix’s minute explanations of Volney is
an epiphany for the monster. “For a long time I could not conceive how one
man could go forth to murder his fellows, or even why there were laws and
governments,” he reports, “but when I heard details of vice and bloodshed, my
wonder ceased, and I turned away with disgust and loathing.”32 An experience
of reading (via interpretive read-aloud) awakens the monster to the knowledge
of good and evil and evokes his first impulse to murder. Through reading, he
becomes Adam, but also Cain. Though Felix is not the monster’s parent, he
serves as the monster’s tutor, in loco parentis, Jean-Jacques to the monster as to
orphaned Emile. Parental influence, the monster’s education demonstrates, can
have unintended effects as disastrous as parental neglect.
Furthermore, says the monster, “The words induced me to turn toPHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 2018
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wards myself.”33 In the light of what he has learned about humankind’s respect
for power and wealth, which he contrasts with his own humble situation, the
monster asks for the first time, “Was I then a monster?”34 With these questions
in mind, the monster turns to a second set of reading material, three books he
finds in a lost “leathern portmanteau”: The Sorrows of Young Werther, Paradise Lost,
and Plutarch’s Lives.35 There are connections between Frankenstein and each of
these books, most obviously with Paradise Lost, a quote from which serves as the
epigraph to the novel. The set’s inclusion of Plutarch’s Lives, whose significance
is less obvious, gestures to Rousseau, or so I argue in this article’s conclusion.
Throughout Frankenstein, men become the men in books they read—
alchemists, explorers, murderers. Rousseau says he became the men in Plutarch.
By reading Plutarch, does the monster therefore become the same men Rousseau
became? And, by the logic that if A=C and B=C then A=B, does this imply that
the monster is, in some sense, Rousseau? He is also, of course, in another sense
Young Werther, and the rebel angel, and the murderer of empire-builders, but
there can be no uniform reading of this polysemous text. So he is not exactly
Rousseau, but the connection has significance. Retooling Johnson’s insight that
the monster serves as a “figure” for problems of textual representation rather
than as an allegory for any particular person, we might describe the monster as
a “figure” for the potentially monstrous effects of texts, especially Rousseau’s
texts, on readers.

FORESIGHTED MOTHERS
There is one more reader to consider, the one who frames Rousseau’s
life in her biographical essay by emphasizing his formation as a man through
reading. What sort of man has that reader become? No man at all, of course.
Rather, in Frankenstein as well as in that essay, Shelley tells readers why not to
become the men—or women—whose lives we read. Like Mary Wollestonecraft’s
Vindication of the Rights of Women, Frankenstein challenges Rousseau’s fantasy of
woman as self-abnegating mother, personified in Emile by Sophie, who lives
through Emile and their children, and in Rousseau’s novel La Nouvelle Heloise by
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Julie, who does Sophie one better by dying happy after jumping into Lac Lemann
to save her drowning child. Become that woman, Rousseau suggests. What a
monstrous idea!, retort Wollestonecraft and Shelley. Shelley’s critique builds
upon Wollestonecraft’s, insofar as Shelley challenges Rousseau’s retrogressive
conception of femininity but also the entire conceit of discursively constructing
idealized parents for readers to model themselves after.
To know what to make of Shelley’s writing, we need to know what
to make of her reading. When she wrote Frankenstein, Shelley had recently read
Rousseau’s Confessions and Emile, texts in which Rousseau establishes himself as
writer-of-lives par excellence.36 Emile is not usually considered autobiographical,
though scholars have assigned it to a range of genres. It has been called a novel
and a philosophical essay, and, because 18th century readers understood it to be
offering advice on raising children, it also engendered the modern child-rearing
manual, whether or not Rousseau meant it to. In an origin-story of Emile and
Emile, character and book, Rousseau provides grounds for reading it as a hybrid
of all these. “Someone of whom I know only the rank had the proposal to
raise his son conveyed to me,” Rousseau tells us.37 He refused, he says, because
“I feel my incapacity too much ever to accept such employment. … Not in a
condition to fulfill the most useful task, I will dare at least to attempt the easier
one; following the example of so many others, I shall put my hand not to the
work but to the pen.”38 Then follows another paradox: because he is incapable
of raising a child, Rousseau will explain how to raise a child:
I have hence chosen to give myself an imaginary pupil, to
hypothesize that I have the age, health, kinds of knowledge,
and all the talent suitable for working at his education, for
conducting him from the moment of his birth up to the one
when, become a grown man, he will no longer have need of
any guide other than himself.39
This book, in other words, will imagine Jean-Jacques to be not the man he is, the
man who eventually confesses to abandoning his five children, but an idealized
father figure. It functions as a sort of fantasy autobiography, in which Rousseau
becomes the imaginary parent whose life he writes.40
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Yet the addressee of Emile can no more become the educator JeanJacques than can Rousseau. In the Preface’s first line, Rousseau tells the reader
that “This collection of reflections and observations … was begun to gratify
a good mother who knows how to think.”41 In the third paragraph of Book I,
he expands the audience to all mothers, addressing and defining the reader as
follows: “It is to you that I address myself, tender and foresighted mother, who
are capable of keeping the nascent shrub away from the highway and securing
it from the impact of human opinions.”42 Emile is addressed to women; if you
the reader happen to be a man, this romance of a text puts you into a feminized
subject position. Continuing in the second-person, Rousseau tells mothers to
“Form an enclosure around your child’s soul at an early date. Someone else
can draw its circumference, but you alone must build that fence.”43 With this,
Rousseau begins a book that sets higher expectations than any real parent could
possibly meet. The ideal parent is to withdraw from society for 18 years in order
to control all influences on the child. Or, at least, that is the situation that faces
the tutor—and, eventually, Sophie, who takes his place of total responsibility in
the next generation. In Emile’s model of the ideal mother, her soul is also to be
enclosed, tucked away like the monster in his shelter at the DeLacy’s. The adult
Emile does engage in other labor, giving him some leave from child-raising,
but Sophie, given the excessive requirements of foresight, can only submerge
herself in motherhood (presumably, excepting short breaks to attend to her
appearance and flirt with Emile).
Rousseau’s catastrophic ideal is with us still, running off in all directions.
Contemporary idealizations of parental involvement, which are embedded in
policy directives and worked into the common sense notion that “it all comes
down to the parents,” continue to hold parents responsible to an impossibly
high degree for their children’s futures. This appears to have intensified in recent decades. As Shelley forecast with Victor’s condemnation of his father, the
idea that parents should constantly engage with children’s needs and interests
has become a measure for judging fathers as well as mothers. Yet parents are
no more able than ever to control the effects of reading material, other media,
social encounters, and other environmental factors on their children, who furPHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 2018
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thermore have unpredictable interests, talents, and reactions.
“Our first duty,” Shelley comments in her account of Rousseau’s
“short-sighted” decision to abandon his children, “is to render those to whom
we give birth wise, virtuous and happy, as far as in us lies.”44 Frankenstein gives
shape to what that caveat “as far as in us lies” entails. It recognizes the paramount importance of the parent-child relationship to the child’s education, but
it also recognizes its limitations. So long as Rousseau’s ideal of self-abnegating
parenthood continues to haunt us, as it does, Shelley’s critique of his suggestion
that one person’s life-story can be collapsed into another’s—reader’s into writer’s,
parent’s into child’s—remains radical and revelatory. Her novel demonstrates
limitations inherent in parents’ education of their children and the catastrophic
effects of denying those limitations, effects that the theorists, technocrats, and
promoters of parental involvement are, like Victor Frankenstein facing his
monster, loathe to accept.
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